In the often cited—but rarely understood—historical case of Galileo, a court was called on to address scientific questions about the nature of the universe. Unsurprisingly, the outcome of that proceeding was a disastrous affirmation of the orthodoxy current at the time. Courtrooms have never been a good forum for addressing questions of science or religion, and they remain ill equipped to address these questions in the present. This has been illustrated in the recent series of legal skirmishes over intelligent design (ID); in the near future we will no doubt see more examples of why these matters are best left in the world of academia and out of the realm of public policy.
ID is a theory that states: “Certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection.” On cursory examination this modest proposal does not sound like a religious doctrine, but in the recent case of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District the question of whether ID is religion was answered with a resounding “Yes.” In closing arguments, lawyers for the plaintiffs argued that “at this trial, plaintiffs have submitted overwhelming evidence that intelligent design is just a new name for creationism discarding a few of traditional creationism tenets, such as direct reference to God or the Bible and a specific commitment to a young earth, but maintaining essential aspects, particularly the special creation of kinds by a supernatural actor.”
Judge John E. Jones III agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that ID is equivalent to creationism and, as creationism has been previously ruled to be religious, teaching it in government-run schools is a violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. His ruling states: “To preserve the separation of church and state mandated by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Art. I, § 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we will enter an order permanently enjoining Defendants from maintaining the ID Policy in any school within the Dover Area School District, from requiring teachers to denigrate or disparage the scientific theory of evolution, and from requiring teachers to refer to a religious, alternative theory known as ID.”
The ruling in Kitzmiller may have came as a shock to some of those involved in the defense, but not to those who understand the traditionally conservative approach taken by courts. In the tradition of the court that convicted Galileo, Judge Jones endorsed the current orthodoxy and rejected an alternative idea by ruling that ID is religion, not science. This illustrates once again why courts are not the best, or even a useful, forum for deciding matters of science. Science does not advance by espousing entrenched orthodoxy, but by exploring alternative ways of viewing nature and testing them to see which theories stand up best in light of empirical reality. 
It is true that Darwinian evolution is the current orthodoxy in science, but forbidding a school district “from requiring teachers to denigrate or disparage the scientific theory of evolution” could be construed as a ban on teaching science as it is practiced and an endorsement of teaching orthodoxy as a science substitute. It is the work of scientists to question current theories, test them, question them again, and ultimately reject them if they fail to withstand rigorous scrutiny. It seems incredible that a school board would need to ask teachers to question a scientific theory, or that a court would find it necessary to forbid this. In short, Judge Jones was correct in recognizing Darwinism as the current orthodoxy, but still revealed a profound misunderstanding of the very nature of science.
One of the more startling aspects of the Kitzmiller et al. ruling was the judge’s assertion that some of the defendants had “lied outright under oath on several occasions.” Unfortunately, this kind of accusation is not new in cases involving questions of science and religion. In the famous Arkansas creation science case, McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, the eminent philosopher of science and enthusiastic Darwinist Michael Ruse has been accused of disingenuously advocating a position in his testimony that “is a laughingstock among his professional peers and an ethical and conceptual embarrassment to his profession.” Ruse has defended himself by stating that “creationism of the ilk to be found in John Whitcomb and Henry Morris’s Genesis Flood is not [science]. (It was their kind of creationism that I had in my sights in Arkansas.).” This sounds disturbingly like an end-justifies-the-means rationalization for an expert testifying under oath to misrepresent the state of the art in their field with the specific purpose of throwing the trial.
The arguments presented by Ruse in the Arkansas creation science case fall into a general category commonly referred to as “demarcation arguments.” These are among the most common arguments used in discussions of whether something is or is not science. It is easy to see the attractiveness of such arguments, as they provide nice clear ways of demarcating between science and everything else. One example would be the criterion proposed by Karl Popper, that to be scientific an idea must, at lest theoretically, be subject to falsification. The problem with this argument, and demarcation arguments in general, is the lack of success in developing criteria that include everything generally accepted as science while excluding everything that is not. For example, in the case of Darwinism, the concept of natural selection or “survival of the fittest” has been criticized as a tautology that is unfalsifiable:
Question: Which individuals survive?
Answer: The fittest ones.
Question: Which individuals are the fittest?
Answer: The ones that survive.
Ironically, Popper himself endorsed the idea that natural selection is a tautology and thus is unfalsifiable, as it has no explanatory power, an endorsement he later recanted. Much has been written trying to construct survival of the fittest in a way that is falsifiable, and it may in fact be possible to do this, but it does seem that this particular facet of Darwinism is vulnerable to criticism for not being actually falsifiable. Thus while demarcation criteria serve as rules of thumb for deciding whether something is science or not, relying on a single criterion, or even a group of demarcation criteria, does not achieve the intended unambiguous means of ruling ideas into or out of the science category.
In the specific case of anti-ID demarcation arguments, it is common to attempt to exclude ID from science because it lacks predictive power raising questions about how one would design a research program based on ID. Naturally, these accusations have been addressed by ID supporters in various ways, but the simplest response is probably that to be scientific, a theory may not have to meet this particular demarcation criterion. Science may include some things that are simply brute observations, such as that a plethora of profoundly different animal fossils are found in Cambrian rocks.
Proponents of Darwinian orthodoxy have also worked to load definitions of science so that they include only Darwinism of the type that excludes any possible supernatural interaction with the material world. An example of this occurred during development of science standards in Ohio during 2001. Initially grade 10 students were to be expected to “recognize that scientific knowledge is limited to natural explanations for natural phenomena based on evidence from our senses or technological extensions.” By limiting science to “natural explanations” the answer to the question of life’s origin and development is answered before the investigation begins; life came about by natural forces and not supernatural intervention. It may be possible to formulate ID in such a way that the intelligence is not outside of nature, so definitions of this kind may not exclude ID, but it is probably for the best that this definition was modified to the much more epistemologically neutral “recognize that science is a systematic method of continuing investigation, based on observation, hypothesis testing, measurement, experimentation, and theory building, which leads to more adequate explanations of natural phenomena.”
Another strategy used against ID is to associate it with religious ideas. Those who oppose ID commonly refer to it as “intelligent design creationism,” which associates ID with the religious belief of creationism. The implication is that if something falls into the religion category, then it can’t be also categorized as science. It could be argued that in the courts, efforts to promote “creation science” failed in part because the idea that religion (creationism) and science could coexist within a single category was inconceivable. In any case, the specific religious position of creationism was sufficient criterion to rule creation science out of government-run schools on constitutional grounds.
This explains in part why anyone would even bother to ask whether ID is science or religion. Champions of the current orthodoxy in science hope to use the courts as the forum to resolve the issues raised for Darwinism by ID. Presumably the courts are seen by some as providing an advantage to the conservative Darwinian side. Thus the competition of ideas about the origin and nature of life is shifted from a matter of exclusive use of logic, data, and rhetoric to very different questions of constitutional law, civil rights, and other political considerations under which normal science should not, one would hope, be subject.
The very question “Is ID science or religion?” is loaded, as it requires that ID be either one or the other. But these two options do not represent the entire universe of possibilities; ID could be both science and religion or possibly neither. As there is general agreement that ID has something to do with science and religion and not much to do with home economics, poetry, or other possible categories of knowledge, the option that it could be neither science nor religion will not be discussed here (although this may be worth thinking about, and the possibility that it, along with much of Darwinism, falls more comfortably into the category of philosophy is certainly of interest).
The question of whether something could be both science and religion (or philosophy) is worth considering. Philosopher and author Nancy Pearcey has argued strongly that a false dichotomy entered Western thinking at the time of the Enlightenment. In this false dichotomy, religion, the humanities, ethics, and other matters of the private mind are viewed as completely separate entities from science and reason, which are matters of public knowledge or universal truth. In the real world, science is not isolated from issues of philosophy, religion, or ethics, and this may explain some of the difficulties inherent in demarcation arguments. Science does not sit in a nice neat box, and neither does religion or the humanities. In reality much of the truly exciting activity happens at the interface between different areas of knowledge, and some things, especially in the realm of ideas, may very well have both scientific and religious facets to them. In short, ID may be science and yet have strong religious implications as well.
ID is not unique in being possibly science while also having profound religious implications. An excellent modern example of this would be the emergence of big bang cosmology, which was initially strongly resisted by atheist scientists because of its profound religious implications. Instead of an eternal universe, cosmologists had to deal with a beginning with all that beginnings imply. As John Gribbin put it in Nature: “The biggest problem with the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe is philosophical—perhaps even theological—what was there before the bang….The best way around this initial difficulty is provided by a model in which the universe expands from a singularity, collapses back again, and repeats the cycle indefinitely.” On the other side, some religious people have seen the big bang as incompatible with their theology and responded with their own challenges to it.
Of course big bang cosmology is not the only area in which science and theology may interface. Archaeology (particularly in the Middle East), the end of life, fetal stem cell research, and Copernicus’s heliocentric solar system championed by Galileo are a few of the plethora of areas in which religion has come into direct contact with empirical knowledge. The ideas of Copernicus are not now rejected on theological grounds, but at the time of the Reformation they were rejected by both Protestants and Catholics alike on theological and scientific grounds. In modern times, accumulating archaeological evidence for or against the existence of David, king of Israel, is hardly rendered unscientific just because he is mentioned in the Bible. The question is not one of whether science or religion is being dealt with, but what role is to be allowed for either or both in understanding those areas in which they interface. In the big bang example, at least until the next revolution in cosmology, it was probably best to go with the empirical knowledge and not the atheistic theology of those who opposed the theory. Why ID, or Darwinism, for that matter, would be different is not obvious.
Religious implications did not cause big bang cosmology to be squelched by judges. During its development as a scientific theory, it was not subjected to legal challenges in courtrooms around the United States. If it had been, newspapers could very well have been filled with quotes by opponents referring to “big bang creationism.” Because the theory was allowed to compete in the marketplace of ideas, we now have a better appreciation of the universe we occupy than was given by steady state universe cosmology.
|
Is the idea that “certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection” religious? It does not invoke God or gods, magic, demons, angels, the Bible, the Koran, the six Vedangas, four Sutras, Dhammapada, or any other form of supernatural revelation or holy book. This clearly differentiates it from creationism, but ID still has obvious religious implications for those willing to believe in religious things. Having said that, ID is similar to Darwinian evolution, which has its own set of religious implications, in that it is quite possible to embrace both ID and theistic or atheistic religious views. Yes, ID may inform those views, but it does not compel belief in the supernatural, and in fact scientists as eminent as Nobel Prize laureate Francis Crick have seen the inadequacy of Darwinian mechanisms to produce what we see in nature, particularly at the molecular level, and yet have not felt compelled to embrace the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
Is ID science? To answer this question requires that one actually understand what science is, and, in the absence of reliable demarcation arguments, this is not as simple as one would hope. Having said that, it should be possible to determine whether ID exhibits characteristics commonly accepted as those exhibited by other ideas that fall into the category of science. First, it is essential to understand that to be scientific, an idea does not have to be true or correct. If this were the case, then no ideas would be science, as science is characterized by its tentative nature. The theories held as science today represent the best understanding we have, but they are always subject to revision as more data is collected, better models are constructed, more experimental tests are carried out and new related ideas develop. To the degree that ID relies on empirical data and its logical interpretation, it is reasonable to categorize it as science, whether it has religious implications or not.
Ironically, much of the criticism of ID stems from the fact that it goes only as far as empirical data and logic can go and no further. Thus while the implications are obvious to religious people and those who oppose theistic religion, it does not step over the threshold into those parts of religion that are exclusively informed by revelation.
Realistically, the jury is out on whether ID is correct, whether it will be accepted as true. Before it is taught along with other scientific concepts to public grade school and high school students, ID should be openly contested in the rough-and-tumble academic world. ID proponents must present their arguments, and those arguments must be rigorously examined. Only then, if enough minds have been convinced that it is a viable idea, does it belong in the science curriculum of government-run schools. This process should be carried out irrespective of any religious implications of ID, although it would be asking too much to expect that religious ideas would not serve as powerful motivators in the competition of ideas. Because ID is an emerging idea, it should be debated in the forums where such emerging ideas are best examined; specifically, ID should be openly tested in university classes and in scientific literature and meetings. Perhaps it is a measure of the power of the nascent ID argument that desperate efforts are being made to exclude a fair evaluation of ID from such academic discussions.
Clearly the competition necessary to properly evaluate ID will be stifled if the entire process is skipped because of overeager local school boards who wish to intercalate ID into science classes before it has proven itself. In addition, premature injection of ID into government-sponsored schools provides a gift to champions of the current Darwinian orthodoxy who wish to short-circuit the process by using the courts to attack ID rather than defending their own ideas in the appropriate academic setting. If either court judgments or premature forcing of ID into classrooms is the way the ID debate is resolved, it will be a tremendous loss. Without a proper academic vetting, ID will never gain the strength and confidence it would enjoy if it survives being properly challenged.
On the other hand, using the courts to advance an orthodoxy has not proven to be a successful long-term strategy in the past. Despite Galileo’s courtroom conviction of heresy, the Copernican heliocentric solar system he advocated has now become the orthodoxy in science. Repeating the mistakes made in Galileo’s case would be tragic, whether it is with ID or any other emerging idea in science that has religious implications. Modern courts should not be declaring scientific ideas such as ID heretical because of their religious implications or because of some parties’ interest in the prevailing orthodoxy. In the specific case of ID, “it would be very foolish to throw away the right answer on the basis that it doesn’t conform to some criteria for what is or isn’t science.”
|
Timothy Standish is a research scientist at the Geoscience Research Institute, Loma Linda, California.
1 This is how intelligent design is defined by the Discovery Institute, a leading ID think tank. It can be found at: www.discovery.org/csc/topQuestions.php#questionsAboutIntelligentDesign.
2 Plaintiffs’ closing arguments, Kitzmiller Versus Dover Area School District, pp. 30, 31. www2.ncseweb.org/kvd/trans/2005_1104_day21_pm.pdf.
3 Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ Document 342 Filed 12/20/2005 Judge Jones Memorandum Opinion and Order, p. 138. www.pamd.uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/decision.htm.
4 Ibid., p. 105.
5 J. A. Campbell, “Intelligent Design, Darwinism, and the Philosophy of Public Education,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1998): 491.
6 J. C. Whitcomb, H. M. Morris, The Genesis Flood: The Biblical Record and Its Scientific Implications., (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1961).
7 M. Ruse, “On Behalf of the Fool,” in Darwinism, Design, and Public Education, J. A. Campbell and S. C. Meyrs, eds., (East Lansing., Mich.: Michigan State University Press 2003), pp. 475-485.
8 K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1963).
9 K. Popper, “Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind,” Dialectica 32, (no. 3-4 (1978): 339-355.
10 Original Ohio State Science Standards, 2001, “Scientific Ways of Knowing,” Grade 10, Indicator 3, which was later modified.
11 Ibid., p. 147.
12 This term is used consistently by spokespeople for anti-ID organizations such as the National Center for Science Education (NCSE) www.natcenscied.org/. It even appears in the title of a book: R. T. Pennock, ed., Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives (MIT Press, (2001).
13 N. R. Pearcey, Total Truth: Liberating Christianity From Its Cultural Captivity (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 2004).
14 J. Gribbin, “Oscillating Universe Bounces Back,” Nature 259 (1976): 15, 16. For other even more recent examples of opposition in Nature to big bang cosmology see: A. Grünbaum, “Pseudo-Creation of the Big Bang,” Nature 344 (1990):821, 822.; J. M. Lévy-Leblond, “Unbegun Big Bang,” Nature 342 (1989): 23; J. Maddox, “Down With the Big Bang,” Nature 340 (1989): 425.
15 Among the more prominent organizations promoting this position are the Institute for Creation Research, Answers in Genesis, and the Creation Research Society. The primary theological objection raised relates to the age of the universe suggested in current big bang models, but the objections raised are not exclusively theological and deal with specific phenomena not well explained within a purely naturalistic big bang model.
16 F. Crick and L. E. Orgel, “Directed Panspermia,” Icarus 19 (1973): 341-346, and F. Crick, Life Itself (Simon & Schuster), 1981).
17 Leonard Susskind, quoted in G. Brumfiel, “Our Universe: Outrageous Fortune,” Nature, Jan. 5, 2006.
|
TOP LEVEL
Past Issues
Printer-friendly page
Send this page to a friend